[Bug 2142] openssh sandboxing using libseccomp

[bugzilla-daemon at mindrot.org]

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2142

--- Comment #2 from Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden at gmail.com> ---
So libseccomp would be "untrusted", similar to kerberos ?

libseccomp has seen steady progress, and I think that it would be nice
if openssh takes advantage of it if it is deployed on a fairly recent
linux system.

http://www.paul-moore.com/files/lj/libseccomp-pmoore-lss2012-r1.pdf

Please see page 3 :-)

Capsicum is also working towards a similar approach with libcapsicum &
libangel.

(https://code.google.com/p/capsicum-core/)

I'm not suggesting replacing will's seccomp patch, but rather provide
it as an additional build time option that package maintainers can take
advantage of if libseccomp is present.

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