[openssh-commits] [openssh] 03/03: upstream commit
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djm pushed a commit to branch master
in repository openssh.
commit a165bab605f7be55940bb8fae977398e8c96a46d
Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
Date: Wed Jan 14 15:02:39 2015 +0000
upstream commit
avoid BIGNUM in KRL code by using a simple bitmap;
feedback and ok markus
---
Makefile.in | 6 +++--
krl.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
sshbuf-getput-basic.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
sshbuf-getput-crypto.c | 18 ++-------------
sshbuf.h | 4 +++-
5 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index 9b485fb..ebd48c3 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -70,7 +70,9 @@ LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
sshkey.o \
sshbuf-getput-basic.o \
sshbuf-misc.o \
- sshbuf-getput-crypto.o
+ sshbuf-getput-crypto.o \
+ krl.o \
+ bitmap.o
LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
@@ -83,7 +85,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
- ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
+ ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
kexc25519.o kexc25519c.o poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o hmac.o \
sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o
diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
index d6bd109..3917338 100644
--- a/krl.c
+++ b/krl.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
-/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.25 2015/01/13 19:04:35 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.26 2015/01/14 15:02:39 djm Exp $ */
#include "includes.h"
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
#include "misc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "digest.h"
+#include "bitmap.h"
#include "krl.h"
@@ -519,6 +520,25 @@ choose_next_state(int current_state, u_int64_t contig, int final,
return new_state;
}
+static int
+put_bitmap(struct sshbuf *buf, struct bitmap *bitmap)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ u_char *blob;
+ int r;
+
+ len = bitmap_nbytes(bitmap);
+ if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if (bitmap_to_string(bitmap, blob, len) != 0) {
+ free(blob);
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(buf, blob, len);
+ free(blob);
+ return r;
+}
+
/* Generate a KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES KRL section */
static int
revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf)
@@ -529,7 +549,7 @@ revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf)
struct revoked_key_id *rki;
int next_state, state = 0;
struct sshbuf *sect;
- BIGNUM *bitmap = NULL;
+ struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL;
if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
@@ -572,9 +592,9 @@ revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf)
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(sect, bitmap)) != 0)
+ if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0)
goto out;
- BN_free(bitmap);
+ bitmap_free(bitmap);
bitmap = NULL;
break;
}
@@ -595,7 +615,7 @@ revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf)
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
- if ((bitmap = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
@@ -626,8 +646,8 @@ revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf)
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) {
- if (BN_set_bit(bitmap,
- rs->lo + i - bitmap_start) != 1) {
+ if (bitmap_set_bit(bitmap,
+ rs->lo + i - bitmap_start) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
@@ -645,9 +665,9 @@ revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf)
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(sect, bitmap)) != 0)
+ if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0)
goto out;
- BN_free(bitmap);
+ bitmap_free(bitmap);
bitmap = NULL;
break;
}
@@ -671,8 +691,7 @@ revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf)
}
r = 0;
out:
- if (bitmap != NULL)
- BN_free(bitmap);
+ bitmap_free(bitmap);
sshbuf_free(sect);
return r;
}
@@ -784,13 +803,13 @@ format_timestamp(u_int64_t timestamp, char *ts, size_t nts)
static int
parse_revoked_certs(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl *krl)
{
- int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, nbits;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
u_char type;
const u_char *blob;
- size_t blen;
+ size_t blen, nbits;
struct sshbuf *subsect = NULL;
u_int64_t serial, serial_lo, serial_hi;
- BIGNUM *bitmap = NULL;
+ struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL;
char *key_id = NULL;
struct sshkey *ca_key = NULL;
@@ -834,31 +853,32 @@ parse_revoked_certs(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl *krl)
goto out;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
- if ((bitmap = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(subsect, bitmap)) != 0)
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(subsect,
+ &blob, &blen)) != 0)
goto out;
- if ((nbits = BN_num_bits(bitmap)) < 0) {
- error("%s: bitmap bits < 0", __func__);
+ if (bitmap_from_string(bitmap, blob, blen) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
+ nbits = bitmap_nbits(bitmap);
for (serial = 0; serial < (u_int64_t)nbits; serial++) {
if (serial > 0 && serial_lo + serial == 0) {
error("%s: bitmap wraps u64", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
- if (!BN_is_bit_set(bitmap, serial))
+ if (!bitmap_test_bit(bitmap, serial))
continue;
if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl,
ca_key, serial_lo + serial)) != 0)
goto out;
}
- BN_free(bitmap);
+ bitmap_free(bitmap);
bitmap = NULL;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID:
@@ -888,7 +908,7 @@ parse_revoked_certs(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl *krl)
r = 0;
out:
if (bitmap != NULL)
- BN_free(bitmap);
+ bitmap_free(bitmap);
free(key_id);
sshkey_free(ca_key);
sshbuf_free(subsect);
diff --git a/sshbuf-getput-basic.c b/sshbuf-getput-basic.c
index 06d6cc4..8ff8a0a 100644
--- a/sshbuf-getput-basic.c
+++ b/sshbuf-getput-basic.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-basic.c,v 1.3 2015/01/12 15:18:07 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-basic.c,v 1.4 2015/01/14 15:02:39 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
*
@@ -424,3 +424,39 @@ sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len)
memcpy(d + 4 + prepend, s, len);
return 0;
}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(struct sshbuf *buf,
+ const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+ const u_char *d;
+ size_t len, olen;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &olen)) < 0)
+ return r;
+ len = olen;
+ /* Refuse negative (MSB set) bignums */
+ if ((len != 0 && (*d & 0x80) != 0))
+ return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE;
+ /* Refuse overlong bignums, allow prepended \0 to avoid MSB set */
+ if (len > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1 ||
+ (len == SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1 && *d != 0))
+ return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE;
+ /* Trim leading zeros */
+ while (len > 0 && *d == 0x00) {
+ d++;
+ len--;
+ }
+ if (valp != 0)
+ *valp = d;
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = len;
+ if (sshbuf_consume(buf, olen + 4) != 0) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
+ SSHBUF_ABORT();
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c b/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c
index 7fad28b..e2e093c 100644
--- a/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c
+++ b/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-crypto.c,v 1.3 2015/01/12 15:18:07 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-crypto.c,v 1.4 2015/01/14 15:02:39 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
*
@@ -38,24 +38,10 @@ sshbuf_get_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM *v)
size_t len;
int r;
- if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &len)) < 0)
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(buf, &d, &len)) != 0)
return r;
- /* Refuse negative (MSB set) bignums */
- if ((len != 0 && (*d & 0x80) != 0))
- return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE;
- /* Refuse overlong bignums, allow prepended \0 to avoid MSB set */
- if (len > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1 ||
- (len == SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1 && *d != 0))
- return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE;
if (v != NULL && BN_bin2bn(d, len, v) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- /* Consume the string */
- if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
- SSHBUF_ABORT();
- return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
return 0;
}
diff --git a/sshbuf.h b/sshbuf.h
index 3602bc5..ac01919 100644
--- a/sshbuf.h
+++ b/sshbuf.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.h,v 1.3 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.h,v 1.4 2015/01/14 15:02:39 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
*
@@ -212,6 +212,8 @@ int sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len);
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
int sshbuf_get_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM *v);
int sshbuf_get_bignum1(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM *v);
+int sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(struct sshbuf *buf,
+ const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp);
int sshbuf_put_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v);
int sshbuf_put_bignum1(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v);
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
--
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