[openssh-commits] [openssh] 02/03: upstream: fix ssh-keysign for KEX algorithms that use SHA384/512
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Wed Nov 10 17:32:36 AEDT 2021
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djm pushed a commit to branch master
in repository openssh.
commit 239da797cbf07a640d7b1ea02d3f99ace3ef792d
Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
Date: Wed Nov 10 06:25:08 2021 +0000
upstream: fix ssh-keysign for KEX algorithms that use SHA384/512
exchange hashes; feedback/ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 09a8fda1c081f5de1e3128df64f28b7bdadee239
---
ssh-keysign.c | 9 ++++++---
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ssh-keysign.c b/ssh-keysign.c
index d6ac98c6..8b3c9a29 100644
--- a/ssh-keysign.c
+++ b/ssh-keysign.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.67 2021/07/05 01:16:46 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.68 2021/11/10 06:25:08 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@@ -80,10 +80,13 @@ valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, struct sshkey **ret,
if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_from failed");
- /* session id, currently limited to SHA1 (20 bytes) or SHA256 (32) */
+ /* session id */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, NULL, &len)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "parse session ID");
- if (len != 20 && len != 32)
+ if (len != 20 && /* SHA1 */
+ len != 32 && /* SHA256 */
+ len != 48 && /* SHA384 */
+ len != 64) /* SHA512 */
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
--
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