[openssh-commits] [openssh] 03/04: upstream: allow selection of hash at sshsig signing time; code
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commit 2327c306b5d4a2b7e71178e5a4d139af9902c2b0
Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
Date: Wed Jan 5 04:50:11 2022 +0000
upstream: allow selection of hash at sshsig signing time; code
already supported either sha512 (default) or sha256, but plumbing wasn't
there mostly by Linus Nordberg
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1b536404b9da74a84b3a1c8d0b05fd564cdc96cd
---
ssh-keygen.1 | 13 +++++++++++--
ssh-keygen.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
index 58b1f682..212e3525 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.218 2021/11/28 07:15:10 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.219 2022/01/05 04:50:11 djm Exp $
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: November 28 2021 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: January 5 2022 $
.Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
@@ -161,6 +161,7 @@
.Fl s Ar signature_file
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl Y Cm sign
+.Op Fl O Ar option
.Fl f Ar key_file
.Fl n Ar namespace
.Ar
@@ -541,6 +542,14 @@ When performing signature-related options using the
.Fl Y
flag, the following options are accepted:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm hashalg Ns = Ns Ar algorithm
+Selects the hash algorithm to use for hashing the message to be signed.
+Valid algorithms are
+.Dq sha256
+and
+.Dq sha512.
+The default is
+.Dq sha512.
.It Cm print-pubkey
Print the full public key to standard output after signature verification.
.It Cm verify-time Ns = Ns Ar timestamp
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
index f8a9f59b..a8a21ee2 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.444 2022/01/05 04:27:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.445 2022/01/05 04:50:11 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -2512,7 +2512,8 @@ load_sign_key(const char *keypath, const struct sshkey *pubkey)
static int
sign_one(struct sshkey *signkey, const char *filename, int fd,
- const char *sig_namespace, sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
+ const char *sig_namespace, const char *hashalg, sshsig_signer *signer,
+ void *signer_ctx)
{
struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, wfd = -1, oerrno;
@@ -2542,7 +2543,7 @@ sign_one(struct sshkey *signkey, const char *filename, int fd,
free(fp);
}
}
- if ((r = sshsig_sign_fd(signkey, NULL, sk_provider, pin,
+ if ((r = sshsig_sign_fd(signkey, hashalg, sk_provider, pin,
fd, sig_namespace, &sigbuf, signer, signer_ctx)) != 0) {
error_r(r, "Signing %s failed", filename);
goto out;
@@ -2603,8 +2604,8 @@ sign_one(struct sshkey *signkey, const char *filename, int fd,
}
static int
-sig_process_opts(char * const *opts, size_t nopts, uint64_t *verify_timep,
- int *print_pubkey)
+sig_process_opts(char * const *opts, size_t nopts, char **hashalgp,
+ uint64_t *verify_timep, int *print_pubkey)
{
size_t i;
time_t now;
@@ -2613,8 +2614,13 @@ sig_process_opts(char * const *opts, size_t nopts, uint64_t *verify_timep,
*verify_timep = 0;
if (print_pubkey != NULL)
*print_pubkey = 0;
+ if (hashalgp != NULL)
+ *hashalgp = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
- if (verify_timep &&
+ if (hashalgp != NULL &&
+ strncasecmp(opts[i], "hashalg=", 8) == 0) {
+ *hashalgp = xstrdup(opts[i] + 8);
+ } else if (verify_timep &&
strncasecmp(opts[i], "verify-time=", 12) == 0) {
if (parse_absolute_time(opts[i] + 12,
verify_timep) != 0 || *verify_timep == 0) {
@@ -2641,12 +2647,14 @@ sig_process_opts(char * const *opts, size_t nopts, uint64_t *verify_timep,
static int
-sig_sign(const char *keypath, const char *sig_namespace, int argc, char **argv)
+sig_sign(const char *keypath, const char *sig_namespace, int argc, char **argv,
+ char * const *opts, size_t nopts)
{
int i, fd = -1, r, ret = -1;
int agent_fd = -1;
struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL, *privkey = NULL, *signkey = NULL;
sshsig_signer *signer = NULL;
+ char *hashalg = NULL;
/* Check file arguments. */
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
@@ -2656,6 +2664,9 @@ sig_sign(const char *keypath, const char *sig_namespace, int argc, char **argv)
fatal("Cannot sign mix of paths and standard input");
}
+ if (sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, &hashalg, NULL, NULL) != 0)
+ goto done; /* error already logged */
+
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(keypath, &pubkey, NULL)) != 0) {
error_r(r, "Couldn't load public key %s", keypath);
goto done;
@@ -2682,7 +2693,7 @@ sig_sign(const char *keypath, const char *sig_namespace, int argc, char **argv)
if (argc == 0) {
if ((r = sign_one(signkey, "(stdin)", STDIN_FILENO,
- sig_namespace, signer, &agent_fd)) != 0)
+ sig_namespace, hashalg, signer, &agent_fd)) != 0)
goto done;
} else {
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
@@ -2694,7 +2705,7 @@ sig_sign(const char *keypath, const char *sig_namespace, int argc, char **argv)
goto done;
}
if ((r = sign_one(signkey, argv[i], fd, sig_namespace,
- signer, &agent_fd)) != 0)
+ hashalg, signer, &agent_fd)) != 0)
goto done;
if (fd != STDIN_FILENO)
close(fd);
@@ -2708,6 +2719,7 @@ done:
close(fd);
sshkey_free(pubkey);
sshkey_free(privkey);
+ free(hashalg);
return ret;
}
@@ -2724,7 +2736,8 @@ sig_verify(const char *signature, const char *sig_namespace,
struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
uint64_t verify_time = 0;
- if (sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, &verify_time, &print_pubkey) != 0)
+ if (sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, NULL, &verify_time,
+ &print_pubkey) != 0)
goto done; /* error already logged */
memset(&sig_details, 0, sizeof(sig_details));
@@ -2812,7 +2825,7 @@ sig_find_principals(const char *signature, const char *allowed_keys,
char *principals = NULL, *cp, *tmp;
uint64_t verify_time = 0;
- if (sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, &verify_time, NULL) != 0)
+ if (sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, NULL, &verify_time, NULL) != 0)
goto done; /* error already logged */
if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(signature, &abuf)) != 0) {
@@ -2858,7 +2871,7 @@ sig_match_principals(const char *allowed_keys, char *principal,
char **principals = NULL;
size_t i, nprincipals = 0;
- if ((r = sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, NULL, NULL)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0)
return r; /* error already logged */
if ((r = sshsig_match_principals(allowed_keys, principal,
@@ -3216,9 +3229,9 @@ usage(void)
" ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -s signature_file -f allowed_signers_file\n"
" ssh-keygen -Y match-principals -I signer_identity -f allowed_signers_file\n"
" ssh-keygen -Y check-novalidate -n namespace -s signature_file\n"
- " ssh-keygen -Y sign -f key_file -n namespace file ...\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -Y sign -f key_file -n namespace file [-O option] ...\n"
" ssh-keygen -Y verify -f allowed_signers_file -I signer_identity\n"
- " -n namespace -s signature_file [-r revocation_file] [-O option]\n");
+ " -n namespace -s signature_file [-r krl_file] [-O option]\n");
exit(1);
}
@@ -3522,7 +3535,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
exit(1);
}
return sig_sign(identity_file, cert_principals,
- argc, argv);
+ argc, argv, opts, nopts);
} else if (strncmp(sign_op, "check-novalidate", 16) == 0) {
if (ca_key_path == NULL) {
error("Too few arguments for check-novalidate: "
--
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