[openssh-commits] [openssh] 01/01: upstream: Be more paranoid with host/domain names coming from the

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djm pushed a commit to branch master
in repository openssh.

commit 445363433ba20b8a3e655b113858c836da46a1cb
Author: djm at openbsd.org <djm at openbsd.org>
Date:   Mon Oct 24 22:43:36 2022 +0000

    upstream: Be more paranoid with host/domain names coming from the
    
    never write a name with bad characters to a known_hosts file.
    
    reported by David Leadbeater, ok deraadt@
    
    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ba9b25fa8b5490b49398471e0c9657b0cbc7a5ad
---
 ssh.c        |  8 ++++++--
 sshconnect.c | 11 +++++++++--
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index 21cbd7c3..98c68eed 100644
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.578 2022/10/13 09:09:28 jsg Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.579 2022/10/24 22:43:36 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ static struct addrinfo *
 resolve_host(const char *name, int port, int logerr, char *cname, size_t clen)
 {
 	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	const char *errstr = NULL;
 	struct addrinfo hints, *res;
 	int gaierr;
 	LogLevel loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
@@ -276,7 +277,10 @@ resolve_host(const char *name, int port, int logerr, char *cname, size_t clen)
 		return NULL;
 	}
 	if (cname != NULL && res->ai_canonname != NULL) {
-		if (strlcpy(cname, res->ai_canonname, clen) >= clen) {
+		if (!valid_domain(res->ai_canonname, 0, &errstr)) {
+			error("ignoring bad CNAME \"%s\" for host \"%s\": %s",
+			    res->ai_canonname, name, errstr);
+		} else if (strlcpy(cname, res->ai_canonname, clen) >= clen) {
 			error_f("host \"%s\" cname \"%s\" too long (max %lu)",
 			    name,  res->ai_canonname, (u_long)clen);
 			if (clen > 0)
diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
index 7b3f260e..b6781261 100644
--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.358 2022/08/26 08:16:27 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.359 2022/10/24 22:43:36 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo at cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo,
 	char *ip = NULL, *host = NULL;
 	char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp, *ra;
 	char msg[1024];
-	const char *type, *fail_reason;
+	const char *type, *fail_reason = NULL;
 	const struct hostkey_entry *host_found = NULL, *ip_found = NULL;
 	int len, cancelled_forwarding = 0, confirmed;
 	int local = sockaddr_is_local(hostaddr);
@@ -1018,6 +1018,13 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo,
 	    (host_found != NULL && host_found->note != 0)))
 		readonly = RDONLY;
 
+	/* Don't ever try to write an invalid name to a known hosts file */
+	if (!valid_domain(hostname, 0, &fail_reason)) {
+		debug_f("invalid hostname \"%s\"; will not record: %s",
+		    hostname, fail_reason);
+		readonly = RDONLY;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are
 	 * localhost, looking for a certificate, or the hostname was an ip

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