Cipher 'none'

[Richard E. Silverman]

On Sat, 14 Oct 2000, Rachit Siamwalla wrote:

> I agree with people who want the option to allow cipher "none"...

> i just want to make sure the evil guy cannot make those RPC's to my
> machines themselves ...

> Also, having the capability to allow "FallbackToRSH" is probably much
> worse than allowing "Cipher none" in the first place.

FallBackToRsh is only an option with SSH-1.  As I mentioned earlier in
this thread, without encryption, both server authentication and integrity
checking are ineffective in the SSH-1 protocol, so there's not much point
in using SSH at all at that point.

With SSH-2, it is at least a viable option, if you truly don't care about
confidentiality.

-- 
  Richard Silverman
  slade at shore.net