Killing the builtin entropy code

[mouring at etoh.eviladmin.org]

Just so long as we can pull together decent documentation for
all the options they have after the code removal.  I know I'll
be looking at doing PRNGd/OpenSSL mix soon then on my aging Solaris and
NeXT boxes.

BTW Damien, I assume this is your Christmas present to yourself.  So
enjoy.  I won't stir. =)

- Ben

On Fri, 21 Dec 2001, Damien Miller wrote:

> Over the holidays, I intend to finally rid portable OpenSSH of the
> builtin entropy collection code. Here's what I intend to do:
>
> When init_rng is called, we'll check OpenSSL's RAND_status(). If this
> indicates that their PRNG is already seeded, we'll do nothing. This
> effectively detects platforms which have /dev/urandom (or similar)
> configured into OpenSSL.
>
> If OpenSSL isn't seeded, we will fork+suid(user)+exec a subprocess
> "ssh-rand-helper" which will return 64 bytes of randomness to stdout.
> This will be used to seed OpenSSL's PRNG. 512 bits should be enough
> for anyone :)
>
> ssh-rand-helper may be a program which fetches randomness from PRNGd,
> it could be a Yarrow implementation or it could be an adaptation of the
> current entropy code to run in a one-shot mode. I'll certainly implement
> a PRNGd ssh-rand-helper, if time permits I'll do one of the others.
>
> This takes all the responsability out of OpenSSH for collecting random
> numbers and allows sites to implement whatever fallbacks they require
> using wrappers around ssh-rand-helper (which could be shell scripts).
>
> Comments?
>
> -d
>
> --
> | By convention there is color,       \\ Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
> | By convention sweetness, By convention bitterness, \\ www.mindrot.org
> | But in reality there are atoms and space - Democritus (c. 400 BCE)
>
>