Killing the builtin entropy code

Austin Gonyou austin at coremetrics.com
Sat Dec 22 04:20:06 EST 2001


I like the idea of doing this, and also doing something like mod_ssl for
apache does? 

There is a subsection in httpd.conf that says what to use for entropy,
and there can be many different types specified. Perhaps the final
output could be a more configureable openssh with virtual hosts and the
whole bit? This would allow different types of ciphers, and such to be
used, but on a per virt host basis? 

Is that something that could be potentially bad? Just curious. 

On Thu, 2001-12-20 at 19:10, Damien Miller wrote:
> Over the holidays, I intend to finally rid portable OpenSSH of the
> builtin entropy collection code. Here's what I intend to do:
> 
> When init_rng is called, we'll check OpenSSL's RAND_status(). If this
> indicates that their PRNG is already seeded, we'll do nothing. This
> effectively detects platforms which have /dev/urandom (or similar)
> configured into OpenSSL.
> 
> If OpenSSL isn't seeded, we will fork+suid(user)+exec a subprocess
> "ssh-rand-helper" which will return 64 bytes of randomness to stdout.
> This will be used to seed OpenSSL's PRNG. 512 bits should be enough
> for anyone :)
> 
> ssh-rand-helper may be a program which fetches randomness from PRNGd,
> it could be a Yarrow implementation or it could be an adaptation of the
> current entropy code to run in a one-shot mode. I'll certainly implement
> 
> a PRNGd ssh-rand-helper, if time permits I'll do one of the others.
> 
> This takes all the responsability out of OpenSSH for collecting random
> numbers and allows sites to implement whatever fallbacks they require
> using wrappers around ssh-rand-helper (which could be shell scripts).
> 
> Comments?
> 
> -d
> 
> -- 
> | By convention there is color,       \\ Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
> | By convention sweetness, By convention bitterness, \\ www.mindrot.org
> | But in reality there are atoms and space - Democritus (c. 400 BCE)
-- 
Austin Gonyou
Systems Architect, CCNA 
Coremetrics, Inc.
Phone: 512-698-7250
email: austin at coremetrics.com
 
"Have regard for your name, since it will remain for you longer than a
great store of gold."
Ecclesiastes, Aprocrypha
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