Logging of client commands, possible?

[RGiersig at a1.net]

>    OpenSSH is already providing TTY services; logging 
> functionality is all over the place in TTY tools(script,
> most GUI telnet clients, etc.) This ain't a big jump;
> in fact I'd be surprised if it's more than a few 
> dozen lines of code to diff in.

Oh yeah, didn't think about that, the SSH client is also missing 
logging facilities (like xterm and telnet).

>    A *really* nice aspect of friendly TTY logs (we'll leave 
> attacker-logs to the SAR reports, though I doubt there's any
> disagreement that TTY logs would supplement SAR's by helping
> filter out innocent traffic) is that they'd automatically drop
> whatever didn't show up on the TTY, i.e. typed passwords.
> That would make captured logs an order of magnitude less security
> sensitive -- big win.

Hmm, turning off logging when the pty is set to -echo?  Nice idea, but 
I'd definitely would make that optional so the admin still can 
specify: "I want all, I might have to deal with black hats" or "OK, I 
just want to see what trusted users are doing and if they are doing 
something fishy".  If a trusted user does the whole session with -echo, 
that's definitely finshy...

> ... 
>    Thoughts?  I definitely see your perspectives on 
> this... perhaps we can limit abuses by making this a
> compile time option?  Mind you, I *hate* compile time
> options, but we could at least throw up a banner 
> referencing ECPA1986 if it was enabled.

No, please, no compile-time options!!  I'd propose amending the 
connection protocol so the client can display a warning like "WARNING! 
This connection will be logged on the server side.  Do you still want 
to connect? (Y/N)", but then you need some way to always answer 'yes' 
to that for automatisation purposes etc.  You could store that as an 
option with the hostkeys... <wanders off into the darkness mumbling>

Roland
--
RGiersig at cpan.org