ForwardX11Trusted

[Sergio Gelato]

* Damien Miller [2004-03-10 07:57:19 +1100]:
> On Tue, 9 Mar 2004, Colin Watson wrote:
> > Since packaging OpenSSH 3.8p1 for Debian, 

Nice. I did my own private packaging (targeting woody) and should probably
compare with yours.

> > Would anyone think I was crazy for defaulting to ForwardX11Trusted in
> > our OpenSSH package for a while until this becomes more mature? At least
> > then we don't regress.

I've come to the same conclusion for my site: we need ForwardX11Trusted
on by default, to keep users from putting it in their own .ssh/config
files (or shell aliases; real users tend to be more familiar with shell
aliases than with .ssh/config) where we can't easily turn it back off
once the problems are solved.

> Some of the maturing needs to happen in the X11 server libraries, 
> toolkits and applications as well. 
> 
> The X11 server libraries have fixed, but very coarse security policy 

Actually, the security policy is configurable. It's just that the default
configuration needs shaking up a bit to make it work well with a number
of applications. We've seen problems with gv and (intermittently) with
xterm. Also with PyRAF (i.e. in all likelihood with Python's Tkinter
module).

> for what actions an untrusted connection can perform. The toolkits and 
> applications need to stop blindly assuming that every action is possible.
> 
> -d
> 
>