Trick user to send private key password to compromised host

[Roman Fiedler]

Dan Yefimov wrote:
> On Tue, 13 May 2008, Roman Fiedler wrote:
>
>> Sorry, seems that my first statement was not precise. If I connect from
>> my uncompromised local host A to some malicious host B, it could trick
>> me to reenter the private key password so that it is captured on B. This
>> would not be possible by installing an kestroke logger on B, only
>> openssh "acts" as the "keystroke logger" in this case.
>>
> What the attacker can gain from discovering private key encryption password?
> The private key itself is located on the host the ssh is invoked on, not on the
> remote and probably compromised one.

This is correct, but

a) the attacker could have captured the key before by other means, but 
it was not yet useful (e.g. from some backup that became accessible, 
from some network dump when the key was stored via nfs/cifs once)

b) the password could have been used  also for other resources

I know that this is no major problem, so I asked in my first message, if 
openssh developers should even care about such thing.

Roman