Call for testing: OpenSSH-5.9

Damien Miller djm at mindrot.org
Sun Aug 14 10:30:10 EST 2011


Hi,

OpenSSH 5.9 is almost ready for release, so we would appreciate testing
on as many platforms and systems as possible. This release contains a
couple of new features and changes and bug fixes. Testing of the new
sandboxed privilege separation mode (see below) would be particularly
appreciated.

Snapshot releases for portable OpenSSH are available from
http://www.mindrot.org/openssh_snap/

The OpenBSD version is available in CVS HEAD:
http://www.openbsd.org/anoncvs.html

Portable OpenSSH is also available via anonymous CVS using the
instructions at http://www.openssh.com/portable.html#cvs or
via Mercurial at http://hg.mindrot.org/openssh

Running the regression tests supplied with Portable OpenSSH does not
require installation and is a simply:

$ ./configure && make tests

Live testing on suitable non-production systems is also
appreciated. Please send reports of success or failure to
openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org.

Below is a summary of changes. More detail may be found in the ChangeLog
in the portable OpenSSH tarballs.

Thanks to the many people who contributed to this release.

-------------------------------

Features:

 * Introduce sandboxing of the pre-auth privsep child using a new
   sshd_config(5) "UsePrivilegeSeparation=sandbox" mode that enables
   mandatory restrictions on the syscalls the privsep child can perform.
   This intention is to prevent a compromised privsep child from being
   used to attack other hosts (by opening sockets and proxying) or probing
   local kernel attack surface.
    
   Three concrete sandbox implementation are provided (selected at
   configure time): systrace, seatbelt and rlimit.

   The systrace sandbox uses systrace(4) in unsupervised "fast-path"
   mode, where a list of permitted syscalls is supplied. Any syscall not
   on the list results in SIGKILL being sent to the privsep child. Note
   that this requires a kernel with the new SYSTR_POLICY_KILL option
   (only OpenBSD has this mode at present).
 
   The seatbelt sandbox uses OS X/Darwin sandbox(7) facilities with a
   strict (kSBXProfilePureComputation) policy that disables access to
   filesystem and network resources.

   The rlimit sandbox is a fallback choice for platforms that don't
   support a better one; it uses setrlimit() to reset the hard-limit
   of file descriptors and processes to zero, which should prevent
   the privsep child from forking or opening new network connections.

   Sandboxing of the privilege separated child process will become the
   default in a future release. We'd also like to include native
   sandboxes for other platforms.

 * Add new SHA256-based HMAC transport integrity modes from
   http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-dbider-sha2-mac-for-ssh-02.txt
   These modes are hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-256-96, hmac-sha2-512,
   and hmac-sha2-512-96, and are available by default in ssh(1) and
   sshd(8)

 * The pre-authentication sshd(8) privilege separation slave process
   now logs via a socket shared with the master process, avoiding the
   need to maintain /dev/log inside the chroot.

 * ssh(1) now warns when a server refuses X11 forwarding

 * sshd_config(5)'s AuthorizedKeysFile now accepts multiple paths,
   separated by space. The undocumented AuthorizedKeysFile2 option is
   deprecated (though the default for AuthorizedKeysFile includes
   .ssh/authorized_keys2)

 * sshd_config(5): similarly deprecate UserKnownHostsFile2 and
   GlobalKnownHostsFile2 by making UserKnownHostsFile and
   GlobalKnownHostsFile accept multiple options and default to include
   known_hosts2

 * retain key comments when loading v.2 keys. These will be visible in
   "ssh-add -l" and other places. bz#439

 * ssh(1) and sshd(8): set IPv6 traffic class from IPQoS (as well as
   IPv4 ToS/DSCP). bz#1855

 * ssh_config(5)'s ControlPath option now expands %L to the host
   portion of the destination host name.

 * ssh_config(5) "Host" options now support negated Host matching, e.g.
     
     Host *.example.org !c.example.org
        User mekmitasdigoat
     
   Will match "a.example.org", "b.example.org", but not "c.example.org"

 * ssh_config(5): a new RequestTTY option provides control over when a
   TTY is requested for a connection, similar to the existing -t/-tt/-T
   ssh(1) commandline options.

 * sshd(8): allow GSSAPI authentication to detect when a server-side
   failure causes authentication failure and don't count such failures
   against MaxAuthTries; bz#1244

 * ssh-keygen(1): Add -A option. For each of the key types (rsa1, rsa,
   dsa and ecdsa) for which host keys do not exist, generate the host
   keys with the default key file path, an empty passphrase, default
   bits for the key type, and default comment. This is useful for
   system initialisation scripts.

 * ssh(1): Allow graceful shutdown of multiplexing: request that a mux
   server removes its listener socket and refuse future multiplexing
   requests but don't kill existing connections. This may be requested
   using "ssh -O stop ..."

 * ssh-add(1) now accepts keys piped from standard input. E.g.
   "ssh-add - < /path/to/key"
 
 * ssh-keysign(8) now signs hostbased authentication
   challenges correctly using ECDSA keys; bz#1858

Portable OpenSSH Bugfixes:

 * Fix a compilation error in the SELinux support code. bz#1851

 * This release removes support for ssh-rand-helper. OpenSSH now
   obtains its random numbers directly from OpenSSL or from
   a PRNGd/EGD instance specified at configure time.

 * sshd(8) now resets the SELinux process execution context before
   executing passwd for password changes; bz#1891

 * Since gcc >= 4.x ignores all -Wno-options options, test only the
   corresponding -W-option when trying to determine whether it is
   accepted.  bz#1900, bz#1901
   selinux code.  Patch from Leonardo Chiquitto 

 * Add ECDSA key generation to the Cygwin ssh-{host,user}-config
   scripts.

Reporting Bugs:
===============

- Please read http://www.openssh.com/report.html
  Security bugs should be reported directly to openssh at openssh.com

OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt,
Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and
Ben Lindstrom.


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