RFC: More explicit ssh agent forwarding on SSH_ASKPASS confirmation
keisial at gmail.com
Thu Apr 4 07:16:34 EST 2013
On 03/04/13 02:20, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On 04/02/2013 06:13 PM, Ángel González wrote:
>> It would be desirable to have instead a text like:
>> Confirmation is required before allowing usage of key foobar
>> Key fingerprint abcdf.
>> to process 1234 (ssh example.com rsync --server --sender -logDtpre.iLsf)
> this material itself could be presented to the user even without changes
> to the protocol.
Right. Although I'm afraid there would be little difference between a
request and one proxied from another ssh instance (specially if it is
with ForwardAgent yes).
>> allegedly for "connecting to example.com (188.8.131.52)"
> this line would need some protocol extension. The SSH_FORWARDING_NOTICE
> protocol detail you've referenced does *not* seem to cover this case,
> but as you noted, you could use it for inspiration.
The provided SSH_AGENT_FORWARDING_NOTICE only covers to whom it
would be sent, the reason would be a nice addition (perhaps as a different
> It seems like the first step would be to implement the prompting you
> describe without the protocol changes and get people using it and giving
> feedback on whether they find it useful. This would probably be just a
> patch to ssh-agent, no need to change ssh or ssh-askpass or anything
> else. I'd be happy to review and test such a patch, if you post it
> someplace publicly.
I think the big benefit would be to separate forwarded requests from
but I could begin with this.
> I'm less convinced of the usefulness of the advisory strings, and they
> have a higher bar to meet in the first place since they require changes
> to the protocol to get them through to the agent. is there a way to do
> version or feature negotiation on the channel so that clients can fall
> back to not providing advisory strings to an agent that might reject or
> crash on them?
If the agent doesn't support the message, it should reply with
The client could then skip that message in later events. An agent that
crashed seems extremely broken.
Thanks for your feedback
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