Host names hashing

[Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL]

What are the cryptographic consequences of host name hah collision?

My point is - the only reason to consider replacing the algorithm here would be to avoid varying around another hash that is not usable cryptographically.  

Regards,
Uri

> On Jan 5, 2022, at 07:05, Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs at redhat.com> wrote:
> 
> Dear colleagues,
> 
> OpenSSH uses SHA1 without any alternate options for hostname hashing (looks
> like this is the last place where an alternate option for SHA1 is not
> available). SHA1 HMAC is considered safe enough for now, but it may change
> so it's definitely worth migrating to more safe algorithms (SHA2?).
> 
> I'd like to discuss possible options of such migration.
> 
> Many thanks!
> -- 
> Dmitry Belyavskiy
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