Packet Timing and Data Leaks

Damien Miller djm at mindrot.org
Tue Aug 8 08:30:41 AEST 2023


On Mon, 7 Aug 2023, Chris Rapier wrote:

> > The broader issue of hiding all potential keystroke timing is not yet fixed.
> 
> Could some level of obfuscation come from enabling Nagle for interactive
> sessions that has an associated TTY? Though that would be of limited
> usefulness in low RTT environments. I don't like the idea of having a steady
> drip of packets as that seems problematic both in terms of code complexity and
> network usage. I also don't like the idea of imposing random jitter though
> that might be easier to implement. However, without actual modeling I have no
> idea if that would actually improve things.

Nagle is usually turned off because it causes annoying perceptions of
non-deterministic latency.

For ssh, IMO sending interactive traffic on a fixed clock (e.g. every
2-4ms) instead of as soon as possible, and adding fake keystroke packets
for some interval after the user stops generating traffic is the way to
fix it. I've slowly been preparing for this by reworking the mainloop and
associated timers.


> Anyway, I was simply thinking about this because the whole bugging of
> typewriters thing crossed my mind recently.
> 
> Chris
> 


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