[RFC] Preferentially TOFU certificate authorities rather than host keys
Matthew Garrett
mjg59 at srcf.ucam.org
Tue Oct 15 09:12:42 AEDT 2024
On Mon, Oct 14, 2024 at 04:29:56PM +0100, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> There's currently no way to express trust for an SSH certificate CA other
> than by manually adding it to known_hosts. This patch modifies the automatic
> key write-out behaviour on user verification to associate the hostname with
> the CA rather than the host key, allowing environments making use of
> certificates to update (potentially compromised) host keys without needing
> to modify client configuration or force users to update their known_hosts.
Oh, and a couple of use-cases I forgot to mention - transparent
association of a CA key with a hostname also allows for either transient
hosts behind the same hostname without needing to retain private key
material, and also makes it possible to have multiple hosts behind the
same hostname without having to share key material. This seems
especially useful for allowing hardware-backed key material to be used
in more complex scenarios than are currently feasible.
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