[EXT] Re: Plans for post-quantum-secure signature algorithms for host and public key authentication?

[Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL]

While SLH-DSA may be more secure than ML-DSA, performance and signature size would make it prohibitive for dynamic authentication for many use cases. 

As to how much security you need – for the vast majority of users ML-DSA is plenty secure “enough”. To the point that US and German governments (probably, among others – I didn’t bother to check) decided to bet their security on it. 
-- 
V/R, 

Uri 

From: openssh-unix-dev <openssh-unix-dev-bounces+uri=ll.mit.edu at mindrot.org> on behalf of Simon Josefsson via openssh-unix-dev <openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org>
Date: Friday, July 11, 2025 at 18:16
To: Aaron Rainbolt <arraybolt3 at gmail.com>
Cc: openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org <openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org>
Subject: [EXT] Re: Plans for post-quantum-secure signature algorithms for host and public key authentication? 

Aaron Rainbolt <arraybolt3 at gmail.com> writes:

> If this was to be "resurrected" to some degree, it would be neat if
> this could be combined with a more traditional Ed25519 signature
> verification, similar to the hybrid PQ kex algorithms currently
> available. Depending on how exactly SLH-DSA works (which I have not
> studied), that might be way over-paranoid, but my workplace likes way
> over-paranoid :P
>
> If there's something I could do to meaningfully contribute to this sort
> of thing, feel free to let me know.

SLH-DSA/SPHINCS+ is based on traditional old-school hashes (e.g., SHA2),
and I think many cryptographers are even more comfortable with that
compared to RSA/ECDSA/EDDSA. Could you read up on SLH-DSA and
re-evaluate?

I like belt and suspenders approaches, but one shouldn't be blind to
specifics. I would not use ML-DSA unless it was in a hybrid, and I
generally prefer hybrid constructs for everything PQ, but for SLH-DSA I
am personally ready to make an exception. The risk for signatures is
smaller than KEX's, where the attack surface becomes passively
decrypting all prior communication, whereas for signatures it requires
an online active SLH-DSA attack to be useful. For long-term SSHSIG used
to authenticate software releases (via git signing) this argument
doesn't apply though.

Still, maybe this is a losing fight, and that it is actually simpler to
promote Ed25519 + SLH-DSA in a hybrid because the optics of it is
simpler to take in for everyone who are migrating from a Ed25519 world.
Having more discussion and opinions on this would be nice.

/Simon 





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