[EXT] Re: Plans for post-quantum-secure signature algorithms for host and public key authentication?

[Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL]

> There is a pretty significant community of users and developers 

> (oftentimes people involved with projects like Kicksecure, Whonix, and 

> Qubes OS, all of which I either contribute to or am paid to work on) 

> where "secure enough for the government" is not secure enough. 

Based on my personal expertise and experience, they are usually coming from ignorance, rather than true understanding of cryptographic (and other!) risks and tradeoffs. 




-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: smime.p7s
Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature
Size: 7920 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/attachments/20250711/39027df8/attachment.bin>