SSH v2 known-hosts problem.

[Markus Friedl]

On Wed, May 24, 2000 at 11:54:36PM +0200, Christian Weisgerber wrote:
> Markus Friedl <markus.friedl at informatik.uni-erlangen.de> wrote:
> 
> > key_read() ignores some valid keys. please try this:
> 
> Seems to fix the problem, but now I get this:
> dsa_key_from_blob: remaining bytes in key blob 147
> 
> Is this informational? A warning?

the patch was broken. try this.

Index: key.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/markus/cvs/ssh/key.c,v
retrieving revision 1.6
diff -u -r1.6 key.c
--- key.c	2000/05/05 18:53:42	1.6
+++ key.c	2000/05/22 17:29:24
@@ -256,12 +256,14 @@
 		blob = xmalloc(len);
 		n = uudecode(cp, blob, len);
 		if (n < 0) {
-			error("uudecode %s failed", cp);
+			error("key_read: uudecode %s failed", cp);
 			return 0;
 		}
 		k = dsa_key_from_blob(blob, n);
-		if (k == NULL)
-			 return 0;
+		if (k == NULL) {
+			error("key_read: dsa_key_from_blob %s failed", cp);
+			return 0;
+		}
 		xfree(blob);
 		if (ret->dsa != NULL)
 			DSA_free(ret->dsa);
@@ -269,10 +271,12 @@
 		k->dsa = NULL;
 		key_free(k);
 		bits = BN_num_bits(ret->dsa->p);
-		cp = strchr(cp, '=');
-		if (cp == NULL)
-			return 0;
-		*cpp = cp + 1;
+		/* advance cp: skip whitespace and data */
+		while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t')
+			cp++;
+		while (*cp != '\0' && *cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')
+			cp++;
+		*cpp = cp;
 		break;
 	default:
 		fatal("key_read: bad key type: %d", ret->type);