Deprecation of scp protocol and improving sftp client

Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL uri at ll.mit.edu
Tue Aug 4 03:06:35 AEST 2020


I hear you - but it seems that the choice is between (a) limiting "scp" functionality to address the security vulnerability, and (b) killing "scp" altogether.

I'd much prefer (a), even if it means I lose "scp remotehost:foo\* .". 

Especially, since (almost always) I have equal privileges on both local and remote hosts, so in that case I just originate that "scp" from that remote. ;-)

TNX


On 8/3/20, 11:09, "Thorsten Glaser" <t.glaser at tarent.de> wrote:

    On Mon, 3 Aug 2020, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL wrote:

    > I conjecture that only few of the existing use cases rely on remote expansion. 

    No, this is used all the time.

    scp remotehost:foo\* .

    (Unless rsync is available, but sadly that’s ⓐ GPLv3 and ⓑ not
    universally installed.)

    bye,
    //mirabilos
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