Certificate spec anomaly?

[Damien Miller]

On Mon, 19 Sep 2022, Brian Candler wrote:

> On 19/09/2022 22:45, Damien Miller wrote:
> > > AFAICT, this allows anyone with*any*  user certificate signed by the CA
> > > to authenticate, with or without principals. That's clearly less than
> > > ideal, but at least it was configured explicitly on this account, and
> > > the attack surface is limited to that one particular account.
> > Right, that's the use-case.
> 
> OK, but I don't see how to configure "accept a certificate with no
> principals", versus "accept a certificate with *any* set of principals"

Ah, that seems to have been broken at some point. I guess nobody uses it
for authorized_keys...

-d