post-quantum

[Klaus Ethgen]

Am Sa den  7. Nov 2026 um 10:00 schrieb Theo de Raadt:
> > As I said, I know about that fact. But we live far away from
> > post-quantum times and I have not enough trust in the new algorithms
> > right now.
> 
> You could also run code from 3 years ago.  It does not contain this pesky
> crypto code or thousands of other bugs fixes which might not be trustworthy.

Apart from your ranting, curve25519-sha256 is not insecure. It is even
worse, this is the only kex key that works with all more or less recent
ssh implementations.

I, for example, depend on devuan chimaera which has no recent added kex
algos implemented.

> After all it is not the crypto algorithm you don't trust... is the
> decision makers who put this in, who you don't trust.  I assert that is
> the true situation.

Well, no.. It is the algo. Take, for example the ecdsa or plain dsa. In
time they was trusted by ssh and community but never by me. And I kept
being right.

> This asks the question what "trust" means.  You don't trust us for this
> decision.  I urge you to not trust any of our decisions, so you have to go
> back at least 3 years, maybe even 10 years, maybe you have to run some
> other code entirely untouched by this leadership group!

Well, I trust as far as I could. In terms of algos I try to make my own
decision. This might be wrong but I wasn't wrong with the most.

Gruß
   Klaus
-- 
Klaus Ethgen                                       http://www.ethgen.ch/
pub  4096R/4E20AF1C 2011-05-16            Klaus Ethgen <Klaus at Ethgen.ch>
Fingerprint: 85D4 CA42 952C 949B 1753  62B3 79D0 B06F 4E20 AF1C
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 728 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/attachments/20261107/6d43b638/attachment.asc>