Call for testing: OpenSSH 6.6

[Andy Tsouladze]

openssh-SNAP-20140302.tar.gz builds and passes all tests on Slackware-14.0 
and 13.37, both 64-bit.

There is, however, a problem with scp which I reported earlier, Jan 20, 
during 6.5 testing, and which did not get any reply.  So I re-tested it, 
and it is still there.  Since the problem is with scp which relies on 
installed ssh, I built a Slackware-13.37 openssh package, and installed it 
in a VM.

The problem happens when I run `scp -3' and only when both remote accounts 
require passwords.  Second password is echo'ed to the terminal.  Below is 
a full session showing what happens:

---------------------------------------------

scp -3 andyt2 at majesty:/etc/group andyt2 at mate:/tmp/group
andyt2 at majesty's password: andyt2 at mate's password:
XXXXXX

---------------------------
As you can see, after the command is started, both remote systems prompt
for a password on the same line.  So I enter a password for user andyt2
and press ENTER.  What happens next is probably a bug.  Line advances, and
nothing at all happens.  So I am assuming that now the second system is
waiting for a password.  I enter it, and it appears in the terminal in
cleartext (substituted here with XXXXXX).  The command then proceeds and
finishes successfully.

A workaround I found is to simply press ENTER instead of typing a second
password.  Then, you get an error saying the password is incorrect, and
a new, normal password prompt appears.  Enter the password, and this time,
it is not visible.

This is what it looks like:

----------------------------
andyt at king: andyt> scp -3 andyt2 at majesty:/etc/group andyt2 at 
mate:/tmp/group
andyt2 at majesty's password: andyt2 at mate's password:


Permission denied, please try again.
andyt2 at mate's password:
----------------------------

I would think scp should try to connect to the first remote machine, and 
only when/if authentication completes successfully proceed with the second 
remote machine.

Regards,

Andy

On Sat, 1 Mar 2014, Damien Miller wrote:

> Hi,
>
> OpenSSH 6.6 is almost ready for release, so we would appreciate testing
> on as many platforms and systems as possible. This is a small release
> mostly to fix some minor but annoying bugs in openssh-6.5.
>
> Snapshot releases for portable OpenSSH are available from
> http://www.mindrot.org/openssh_snap/
>
> The OpenBSD version is available in CVS HEAD:
> http://www.openbsd.org/anoncvs.html
>
> Portable OpenSSH is also available via anonymous CVS using the
> instructions at http://www.openssh.com/portable.html#cvs or
> via Git at https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/
>
> Running the regression tests supplied with Portable OpenSSH does not
> require installation and is a simply:
>
> $ ./configure && make tests
>
> Live testing on suitable non-production systems is also
> appreciated. Please send reports of success or failure to
> openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org.
>
> Below is a summary of changes. More detail may be found in the ChangeLog
> in the portable OpenSSH tarballs.
>
> Thanks to the many people who contributed to this release.
>
> Changes since OpenSSH 6.5
> =========================
>
> This is primarily a bugfix release.
>
> New / changed features:
>
> * ssh(1), sshd(8): this release removes the J-PAKE authentication code.
>   This code was experimental, never enabled and had been unmaintained
>   for some time.
>
> * ssh(1): when processing Match blocks, skip 'exec' clauses other clauses
>   predicates failed to match.
>
> * ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results in the
>   destination hostname being changed, then re-parse ssh_config(5) files
>   using the new destination hostname. This gives 'Host' and 'Match'
>   directives that use the expanded hostname a chance to be applied.
>
> Bugfixes:
>
> * ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" in
>   ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692
>
> * sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and systrace
>   sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection is terminated
>   during the pre-auth phase.
>
> * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1 bignum
>   parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug unexploitable to
>   compromise SSH 1 sessions.
>
> * sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in
>   multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184
>
> * ssh(1): avoid unnecessary hostname lookups when canonicalisation is
>   disabled. bz#2205
>
> * sshd(8): avoid sandbox violation crashes in GSSAPI code by caching
>   the supported list of GSSAPI mechanism OIDs before entering the
>   sandbox. bz#2107
>
> * ssh(1): fix possible crashes in SOCKS4 parsing caused by assumption
>   that the SOCKS username is nul-terminated.
>
> * ssh(1): fix regression for UsePrivilegedPort=yes when BindAddress is
>   not specified.
>
> * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix memory leak in ECDSA signature verification.
>
> * ssh(1): fix matching of 'Host' directives in ssh_config(5) files
>   to be case-sensitive again (regression in 6.5).
>
> Portable OpenSSH:
>
> * sshd(8): don't fatal if the FreeBSD Capsicum is offered by the
>   system headers and libc but is not supported by the kernel.
> * Fix build using the HP-UX compiler.
>
> Reporting Bugs:
> ===============
>
> - Please read http://www.openssh.com/report.html
>  Security bugs should be reported directly to openssh at openssh.com
>
> OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt,
> Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and
> Ben Lindstrom.
> _______________________________________________
> openssh-unix-dev mailing list
> openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org
> https://lists.mindrot.org/mailman/listinfo/openssh-unix-dev
>


Dr Andy Tsouladze
Sr Unix/Storage/Security SysAdmin
PWD=`cat /dev/urandom | sed 's/[^\x21-\x7f]//g' | head -c 14`