Golang CertChecker hostname validation differs to OpenSSH

[Peter Moody]

I think I wrote the code in question for the golang library
(https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/527d12e53572562de9fd348d50e1ee4096803cec)

my reading of the sshd manpage is that ssh is more permissive than it should be

SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT :
  ...

  A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within `[' and `]'
brackets then followed by `:' and a non-standard port number.

I actually noticed this last week and meant to email this list to ask
the openssh devs of the 'correct' behavior.


On Sun, May 14, 2017 at 5:24 PM, Adam Eijdenberg <adam at continusec.com> wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> Last week I noticed that the CertChecker in the Go implementation of
> x/crypto/ssh seems to be doing host principal validation incorrectly
> and filed the following bug:
> https://github.com/golang/go/issues/20273
>
> By default they are looking for a principal named "host:port" inside
> of the certificate presented by the server, instead of just looking
> for the host as I believe OpenSSH does.
>
> e.g. the following error is generated:
>
> ssh: handshake failed: ssh: principal "localhost:2022" not in the set
> of valid principals for given certificate: ["localhost"]
>
> Before I ping the bug again, it would be good to get a second opinion
> as to whether that behaviour is correct or not.
>
> Cheers, Adam
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