Legacy option for key length?

[Marc Haber]

On Tue, Jan 02, 2018 at 04:03:34PM +1030, David Newall wrote:
> On 02/01/18 03:29, Michael Ströder wrote:
> > How high is the risk that this unmaintained device is added to
> > yet-another-bot-net in the Internet-of-shitty-devices or is used to
> > enter parts of your network.
> 
> I think that is what is called a straw-man argument.  If a device can be
> compromised in the way you suggest, then I am sure it will be replaced, but
> it will be replaced because it needs to be, not because its management
> interface cannot be accessed via the latest openssh.  Disallowing use of
> openssh doesn't encourage people to throw away expensive gear, it encourages
> them to throw away new versions of openssh.

Imagine an organization which has only reluctantly allowed their network
/ Unix admins to run Linux on their workstations and has only done so
with the admins' promise to run only the latest software.

And now, a bunch of older enterprise devices in the data center cannot
be accessed from those workstations any more.

The admins are forced to say "yes" to the question "will accessing the
device from an enterprise-standard Windows client work".

Now imagine the chance of the admins still being allowed to keep their
Linux workstations.

Not all installations are clueful.

And this all goes without mentioning that people are re-enabling telnet
on their APC powerstrips right in this second because OpenSSH won't work
any more.

Greetings
Marc

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