Legacy option for key length?

[Michael Ströder]

David Newall wrote:
> On 02/01/18 03:29, Michael Ströder wrote:
>> How high is the risk that this unmaintained device is added to
>> yet-another-bot-net in the Internet-of-shitty-devices or is used to
>> enter parts of your network.
> 
> I think that is what is called a straw-man argument.  If a device can be
> compromised in the way you suggest, then I am sure it will be replaced,
> but it will be replaced because it needs to be,

But how do *you* determine without doubts that it does *not* need to be
replaced?

(I do not claim that there's one good way to find out.)

Ciao, Michael.

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